Introduction
Operational commanders have a wide variety of tools available to accomplish their military objectives. IO are simply a set of specialized tools that can accomplish objectives on their own, or in concert with other tools. The problem for the operational commander, however, is that the wide variety of IO, their high degree of specialization, and the ever-changing methods and technologies they employ often present a great deal of uncertainty and unfamiliarity in their application and effects. This also means that the technical gap between information operators and their operational commanders will likely continue to widen, creating even greater uncertainty while exponentially increasing the requirement to trust operators to achieve their assigned objectives. Trust, though, should not be blind. As with any other tool, commanders must have a method of knowing if their IO are effective in achieving their objectives. The first step in measuring effectiveness, then, is knowing what is supposed to be measured. Commanders must effectively articulate this guidance to the staff. The staff must then be able to apply IO in a manner consistent with that guidance, and must have a means of measuring its effects within their area of influence.
Commander's Guidance
The commander's guidance begins with his intent statement. The commander's intent emphasizes four major points: "purpose, method, risk, and end state." 8 When developing his intent statement, the commander typically considers his restated mission, based on his essential tasks (derived during the mission analysis), and the desired end-state that he expects to achieve upon completing those tasks. With that in mind, he develops a general, broad-based idea of how he expects to achieve the desired end state and provides the staff with risks he is and/or is not willing to take. The commander's intent is important because it provides the staff with a starting point in their course of action development, and a common end-point toward which they should direct the effects of those courses of action.
The commander's intent belongs to the commander. He is free to modify the format and the level of guidance, as well as the emphasis he pays to any, all, or none of the various battle functions.
Additionally, he typically does not form his intent in a vacuum. It is typically based on information he receives from his higher headquarters and his own staff as they conduct their mission analysis. When integrated, IO planners would include an evaluation of the higher headquarters' and the adversary's planned and potential IO as well as a summary of his own IO capabilities during the mission analysis briefing.
By doing so, the staff better prepares the commander to include how 
Measures of Effectiveness
Joint doctrine, then, provides a process to facilitate the commander's ability to consciously decide what it is he wants IO to accomplish and how to articulate that to his staff. It also provides a process for staffs to follow when planning and executing operations. In it's sample annexes to operations plans, it requires the staff to list the specific tasks IO is to accomplish; these tasks, as discussed previously in this paper, should come directly from the commander's approved course of action. with "objective data" in order to provide more accurate and consistent assessments. The assessor then also knows the relative importance of the task and who to pass his assessments to. The MOE Worksheet can be a manual card or automated. Regardless of the media used, this system offers a method of ensuring IO indicators are tasked to sensors in accordance with the commander's priorities, are assessed by qualified personnel, and that the assessments make it back to the IO planners. That is, it provides integration during the execution phase to provide a more timely and accurate MOE.
THEATER LEVEL MOE WORKSHEET

Do Doctrine and TTPs Really Matter?
The first half of this paper focused on the doctrinal processes and TTPs available to provide commander's with a MOE. But joint IO doctrine is still relatively new (Joint Pub 3-13 was published in October 1998)…how do we know if the doctrinal processes and TTPs discussed above really work? Operation Allied Force in Kosovo is our only completed Theater level combat It was not until well after the air strikes had begun that General Clark recognized that the Serbian center of gravity was not just its forces in Kosovo, but the will of Milosevic and his supporters as well. 26 
Again
Milosevic provided a better example of how to integrate PsyOps early.
An example of his efforts can be found in the "Bull's Eyes" the Serbians wore during the NATO air strikes. This tactic is credited for unifying the Serbians in defiance of NATO. 27 NATO then found it's self with a more difficult task as it eventually sought to reduce the will of Milosevic and his supporters.
Measures Of Effectiveness In Operation Allied Force
There is no official evidence to demonstrate that NATO ever established formal measures of effectiveness and relevant indicators for IO. The absence of such records indicates that this was not a formal process. That, and the fact that they were not initially integrated into the operational plans speaks volumes about why commanders find it so difficult to know if their IO are effective.
Extensive readings, however, do demonstrate that NATO did informally attempt to measure the effectiveness of their public affairs and PsyOps, but not until they had more clearly recognized tasks, well over a month after the first air strike.
Once they had recognized (though not formal) tasks, and were better With augmentation, the staff was able to follow a fairly straightforward assessment methodology -review the feedback from the indicators, assess success to date, and develop strategies to maintain areas that are favorable to NATO while improving areas that are less or determined that the purpose of these air strikes was not to simply reduce the military forces, but rather, the purpose was to apply enough force to convince Milosevic that he could not win. In coming to that realization, General Clark concluded that the BDA driven methodology "…was too mechanical. We weren't, ultimately, in a battle of attrition, but rather we were using military force to force Milosevic to comply. 34 Reducing Milosevic's support was one of General Clark's overall objectives. He believed that "…the point of the campaign was to break
Milosevic's will (or the will of his supporters) or, ultimately, deny him the capability to continue the ethnic cleansing in Kosovo." Sparing the telephone lines and implementing eavesdropping capabilities also implies some integration among the staff.
Recommendation
Commanders and staffs should utilize joint doctrine and current TTP to develop IO tasks and measure their effectiveness in accomplishing those tasks. As Clark and Wallfesh point out "…doctrine is guidance rather than directive, deviation is at the risk of the commander." 37 Operation Allied Force is a case study in which the commander and his staff deviated from current doctrine and previously studied TTP. As a result, the commander was in the dark regarding his second enemy center of gravity -the will of Milosevic and his supporters. 2 Ibid, viii. 3 Ibid.
